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ESSAY: CYBERBULLYING AND FREEDOM OF
SPEECH
By David L. Hudson, Jr. ∗

Cyberbullying has been called “a social online terror” 1, “a deadly
epidemic” 2, “a nightmare that happens all too often,” 3 and the cause of youth
suicides. High-profile tragedies, such as the suicides of Megan Meier 4, Phoebe
Prince 5, David Molak 6, and Tyler Clementi 7, have led to the enactment of state laws
designed to address harmful online expression that abuses and harasses others. These
tragedies have seared our collective conscience and placed cyberbullying at the
forefront of national headlines. 8 The Pew Center reported in 2018 that 59% of
teenagers contend that they have been the victim of cyberbullying. 9 The White House
has held summits on the issue and October has been designated as Bullying
Prevention month. Public figures and officials across the globe, including First Lady
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1. Don’t Be Cyberbullied, STOMP OUT BULLYING, https://stompoutbullying.org/get-help/aboutbullying-and-cyberbullying/dont-be-cyberbullied/ [https://perma.cc/EG7C-24P5].
DEADLY
EPIDEMIC,
2. John
Stephens,
CYBERBULLYING—A
http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:C5VHQDPXnLYJ:www.kcommhtml.com/ima/
2011_04/cyberbullying.pdf+&cd=5&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us [https://perma.cc/QK99-DDWQ].
3. Phil McGraw, It’s Time to Stop the Cyberbullying Epidemic, HUFFINGTON POST (May 6, 2015
12:51
PM),
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/dr-phil/stop-cyberbullying_b_6647990.html
[https://perma.cc/3AVA-UWL2].
MEIER
FOUND.,
4. See
generally
Meghan’s
Story,
MEGAN
https://meganmeierfoundation.org/megans-story/ 020) [https://perma.cc/933F-VW4D].
5. See Alexi Cohan, Special Report: 9 Years After Phoebe Prince’s Suicide, Anti-Bullying Laws
Failing, BOS. HERALD (Jan. 14, 2009 9:19 AM), https://www.bostonherald.com/2019/01/14/its-been-9years-since-phoebe-princes-death/ [https://perma.cc/2CX9-3SLW]; see also Brian Z. Brazeau, The
Transformation of Indirect Harassment in the 21st Century: Telephone Harassment Laws, Cyberbullying,
and New Ways of Analyzing First Amendment Rights, 22 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 292, 302
(2016).
6. See Candace Amos, Brothers’ Emotional Letter to Stop Bullying Goes Viral Following Youngest
Y.
DAILY
NEWS
(Jan.
8,
2016,
3:47
PM),
Sibling’s
Suicide,
N.
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/brothers-write-letter-bullying-sibling-suicide-article1.2490355 [https://perma.cc/LSK9-UHD3].
7. See Tyler Clementi’s Story, TYLER CLEMENTI FOUND., https://tylerclementi.org/tylers-story/
[https://perma.cc/7GZR-CAUZ].
8. See, e.g. Hilary Schronce Blackwood, Regulating Student Cyberbullying, 40 RUTGERS L. REC.
153, 154 (2012).
9. Monica Anderson, A Majority of Teens Have Experienced Some Form of Cyberbullying, PEW
RES. CTR.: INTERNET & TECH. (Sept. 27, 2018), https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2018/09/27/amajority-of-teens-have-experienced-some-form-of-cyberbullying/ [https://perma.cc/2EJT-C5FD].
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Melania Trump and Prince William of Great Britain, have spoken out against the
phenomenon. 10
It can be hard to quantify cyberbullying given the variety of names that
legislators have assigned to the conduct. Terms such as online harassment, online
bullying, electronic bullying, and digital bullying appear in the code books. States
define the phenomenon differently. The Cyberbullying Research Center defines
cyberbullying as the “willful and repeated harm inflicted through the use of
computers, cell phones, and other electronic devices.” 11
While no one supports one person harassing another person online, many
free-speech advocates worry that the push to combat cyberbullying invades the
province of protected speech or chills speech that some may find offensive. After all,
much speech is in the eye of the beholder, or, as Justice John Marshall Harlan II
famously declared in Cohen v. California, “one man’s vulgarity is another’s lyric.” 12
Some courts have invalidated overly broad and vague cyberbullying laws. Even
though the impetus to combat cyberbullying remains strong, some believe that the
push to pass cyberbullying laws fails to take into account fundamental First
Amendment principles. One critic refers to it as a “moral panic” that has led to the
suppression of free speech. 13
Part I of this essay examines state cyberbullying laws. These laws vary a lot
in terms of language and coverage but this part attempts to group these different state
laws into different categories. This section categorizes cyberbullying laws into two
main categories—(1) those that treat cyberbullying as a crime and (2) those that
address cyberbullying as a violation of a school’s code of conduct. Part II of this
essay then addresses court decisions that deal with cyberbullying. Once again, this
essay examines the topic from both the perspective of (1) criminal law decisions and
(2) school law decisions.
I.

CYBERBULLYING LAWS

Approximately twenty-five (25) states have cyberbullying statutes. 14 They
vary significantly in their verbiage and coverage. Some cyberbullying laws are

10. Jordyn Phillips, First Lady Melania Trump Speaks Out Against Cyberbullying, ABCNEWS (Aug.
20,
2018,
9:52 AM),
https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/lady-melania-trump-speakscyberbullying/story?id=57284988 [https://perma.cc/7DXL-4V9Y]; Dave Burke, Prince William Attacks
Social Media in Passionate Anti-Cyberbullying Speech, THE MIRROR (Nov. 15, 2018),
https://www.mirror.co.uk/news/uk-news/prince-william-kate-middleton-visit-13594700
[https://perma.cc/9EBH-CCPR].
RES.
CTR.,
11. About
the
Cyberbullying
Research
Center,
CYBERBULLYING
https://cyberbullying.org/about-us [https://perma.cc/7WMD-WWLY].
12. 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971); see also David L. Hudson, Jr. Paul Robert Cohen and “His” Famous
F.
INST.
(May
4,
2016),
Free
Speech
Case,
FREEDOM
https://www.freedomforuminstitute.org/2016/05/04/paul-robert-cohen-and-his-famous-free-speech-case/
[https://perma.cc/RQT4-BF5Y].
13. ARTHUR S. HAYES, SYMPATHY FOR THE CYBERBULLY: HOW THE CRUSADE TO CENSOR HOSTILE
AND OFFENSIVE ONLINE SPEECH ABUSES FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION (2017).
14. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 16-28B-3 (West, Westlaw through Act 2020-38); ARK. CODE ANN. § 571-217 (West, Westlaw though 2019 Reg. Sess.); CAL. EDUC. CODE §234.4 (West, Westlaw though Ch.
3 of 2020 Reg. Sess.); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-222d (West, Westlaw through Public Act 20–1);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14 §4164 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 236 of 150th Gen. Assemb. (2019–2020));
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criminal statutes. Others are rooted in the school environment, requiring school
districts to amend their anti-bullying policies to include online bullying.
The laws that criminalize cyberbullying differ greatly in their approach.
Some states have amended existing electronic harassment or online harassment laws
to include cyberbullying. Others specifically have created a new crime specifically
called “cyberbullying.”
A.

Cyberbullying as a Crime

The initial problem with cyberbullying statutes that criminalize such
behavior is a fundamental one—that the definitions of the term cyberbullying appear
so broad as to cover quite a bit of speech that is protected by the First Amendment.
One scholar opines: “The term ‘cyberbullying’ does not have an acceptable legal
definition and it encompasses a broad spectrum of speech disseminated via electronic
communication, ranging from threatening and harassing to annoying, offending,
gossiping, and name calling.” 15
Arkansas’ law may be the broadest law that criminalizes cyberbullying.
After its passage one constitutional law critic called it “the most expansive piece of
cyberbullying legislation in the country” and “the only law that criminalizes
cyberbullying beyond the school setting, regardless of the age of the speaker or
listener.” 16
The law specifically identifies cyberbullying as a term and treats it as an
actual crime. The general criminal statute provides:
A person commits the offense of cyberbullying if:
(1) He or she transmits, sends, or posts a communication
by electronic means with the purpose to frighten, coerce,
intimidate, threaten, abuse, or harass another person; and
(2) The transmission was in furtherance of severe,
repeated, or hostile behavior toward the other person. 17

FLA. STAT. ANN. §1006.147 (West, Westlaw through 2020 2d Reg. Sess.); GA. CODE ANN. §20-2-751.4
(West, Westlaw through Laws 2020 Act 322); IND. CODE ANN. § 20-33-8-0.2 (West, Westlaw through
2020 2d Reg. Sess.); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-6147 (West, Westlaw through 2020 Reg. Sess.); LA. STAT.
ANN. §14:40.7 (Westlaw through 2019 Reg. Sess.); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 20-A § 6554 (Westlaw through
Ch. 676 of 2019 2d Reg. Sess.); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 380.1310b (West, Westlaw through
P.A.2020, No. 67, 2020 Reg. Sess.); MINN. STAT. ANN. §121A.031 (West, Westlaw through 2020 Reg.
Sess.); MO. ANN. STAT. § 160.775 (West, Westlaw through 2019 1st Reg. and 1st Extra. Sess.); NEV.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 388.135 (West, Westlaw through 80th Reg. Sess. (2019)); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§193-F:3 (Westlaw through Ch. 7 2020 Reg. Sess.); N.Y. EDUC. LAW §11 (McKinney, Westlaw through
L.2019 Ch. 758 & L.2020 Ch. 25); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-458.1 (West, Westlaw through 2019 Reg.
Sess.), invalidated by State v. Bishop, 787 S.E.2d 814 (N.C. 2016); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §3301.22
(West, Westlaw through File 29 133rd Gen. Assemb. (2019–2020)); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 339.353
(West, Westlaw through 2020 Reg. Sess.); TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 37.0832 (West, Westlaw through
2019 Reg. Sess.); WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.300.2851(West, Westlaw through Ch. 92 2020 Reg. Sess.).
15. Michal Buchhandler-Raphael, Overcriminalizing Speech, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 1667, 1697
(2015).
16. S. Cal Rose, From LOL to Three Months in Jail: Examining the Validity and Constitutionality of
the Arkansas Cyberbullying Act of 2011, 65 ARK. L. REV. 1001, 1028 (2012).
17. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-71-217 (West, Westlaw through 2019 Reg. Sess.).
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This law seems to suffer from the two chief tools of constitutional
litigators—overbreadth and vagueness. For example, scholars Lyrissa Lidsky and
Amanda Ponzon Garcia explain:
This law suffers from vagueness and overbreadth and is therefore
unconstitutional. The law is vague because it fails to put the
defendant on notice of the types of electronic communications he
or she can engage in without violating the statute and because it
gives law enforcement too much leeway to prosecute mere bad
manners. The law is overbroad because it sweeps a large swath of
clearly protected speech into its purview along with the
unprotected speech it is designed, and constitutionally allowed, to
prohibit. 18
How is a person to know exactly when his or her social media post might be
considered abusive or harassing to another individual? For example, let’s say two
people are vigorously debating the prospective candidates for the upcoming 2020
Presidential election. If one person vehemently criticizes another person’s political
choices, will that be considered abusive? Lidsky and Garcia offer the following
trenchant example: “Would emailing a homophobic, racist, or religiously intolerant
cartoon or joke to a known ‘liberal’ trigger the statute?” 19
The second part of the statute is perhaps even more troubling. It criminalizes
“hostile” behavior. If ever a term could be considered amorphous – the term “hostile”
certainly qualifies. It has taken an entire body of employment discrimination law to
try to unpack the meaning of when certain sexual or racially charged language might
create a hostile workplace environment. And those laws impose civil liabilities, not
criminal penalties. Lidsky and Garcia correctly point out that “the term ‘hostile’ is
so malleable that it would inevitably lead to selective prosecution; the law therefore
allows prosecutors far too much leeway in suppressing unpopular speech or charging
unpopular speakers.” 20
Contrast Arkansas’ cyberbullying statute with that of a more recent effort
by the Michigan legislature, which became effective on March 27, 2019. Michigan’s
cyberbullying law more narrowly defines the term. It provides:
(a)
“Cyberbully” includes posting a message or
statement in a public media forum about any other person
if both of the following apply:
(i)
The message or statement is intended to place a
person in fear of bodily harm or death and expresses an
intent to commit violence against the person.
(ii)
The message or statement is posted with the
intent to communicate a threat or with knowledge that it
will be viewed as a threat.
(b) ”Pattern of harassing or intimidating behavior” means
a series of 2 or more separate noncontinuous acts of
harassing or intimidating behavior.
18. Lyrissa Lidsky & Andrea Pinzon Garcia, How Not to Criminalize Cyberbullying, 77 MO. L. REV.
693, 714 (2012).
19. Id.
20. Id. at 716.
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(c) ”Public media forum” means the internet or any other
medium designed or intended to be used to convey
information to other individuals, regardless of whether a
membership or password is required to view the
information. 21
Michigan’s cyberbullying statute is much more sensitive to First Amendment
concerns, as it defines cyberbullying as a form of a true threat—a recognized
categorical exception to the First Amendment free speech clause. 22 The Supreme
Court established that true threats are a narrow category of speech not protected by
the First Amendment more than fifty years ago in Watts v. United States. 23 Many
years later, in a cross-burning case, the Court clarified that “‘[t]rue threats’
encompass those statements where the speaker means to communicate a serious
expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular
individual or group of individuals.” 24 There remains uncertainty as to the boundaries
of the true threat category. 25
Florida’s cyberbullying statute differs much from that of both Arkansas and
Michigan. Its statute provides:
“Cyberbullying” means bullying through the use of
technology or any electronic communication, which
includes, but is not limited to, any transfer of signs,
signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of
any nature transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, radio,
electromagnetic system, photoelectronic system, or
photooptical system, including, but not limited to,
electronic mail, Internet communications, instant
messages, or facsimile communications. Cyberbullying
includes the creation of a webpage or weblog in which
the creator assumes the identity of another person, or the
knowing impersonation of another person as the author
of posted content or messages, if the creation or
impersonation creates any of the conditions enumerated
in the definition of bullying. Cyberbullying also includes
the distribution by electronic means of a communication
to more than one person or the posting of material on an
electronic medium that may be accessed by one or more
persons, if the distribution or posting creates any of the
conditions enumerated in the definition of bullying. 26

21. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §750.411x(6) (West, Westlaw through P.A.2020, No. 61 of 2020 Reg.
Sess.).
22. David L. Hudson, Jr., True Threats, FREEDOM F. INST. (May 12, 2008),
https://www.freedomforuminstitute.org/first-amendment-center/topics/freedom-of-speech-2/personalpublic-expression-overview/true-threats/ [https://perma.cc/JGD5-MVUH].
23. See 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969).
24. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003).
25. David L. Hudson, Jr., 50 Years Ago, the Court Enters the True Threats Thicket in Watts v. United
States, FREEDOM F. INST. (May 7, 2019), https://www.freedomforuminstitute.org/2019/05/07/50-yearsago-the-court-enters-the-true-threats-thicket-in-watts-v-united-states/#_ftn42 [https://perma.cc/ZMP92UVX].
26. FLA. STAT. § 1006.147(3)(b) (2019).
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Suffice it to say that the state laws on cyberbullying are a veritable hodgepodge or a patchwork quilt of different laws. There still are not very many decisions
that examine the constitutionality of these statutes, many of which are very recent.
However, a cyberbullying statute that criminalizes speech that is merely offensive,
annoying or hostile clearly runs afoul of First Amendment principles. Meanwhile, a
cyberbullying law moored in the true threat doctrine likely will survive a
constitutional challenge.
B.

Cyberbullying at School

Many states have cyberbullying laws that are not part of the state’s
respective criminal code. 27 These states have tackled the problem of cyberbullying
by passing laws that specifically refer to the phenomenon on school grounds. For
example, New Mexico only recently repealed a law that defined cyberbullying as
something specifically tied to the school environment. Its state law provided:
“[C]yberbullying” means electronic communication that:
(1) targets a specific student;
(2) is published with the intention that the
communication be seen by or disclosed to the targeted
student;
(3) is in fact seen by or disclosed to the targeted student;
and
(4) creates or is certain to create a hostile environment on
the school campus that is so severe or pervasive as to
substantially interfere with the targeted student’s
educational benefits, opportunities or performance. 28
Laws like the New Mexico law present challenges because it is often
difficult to determine when speech creates a hostile workplace environment. As freespeech scholar Eugene Volokh wrote: “There is no fixed rule as to what words or
what kinds of speech can create a hostile work environment.” 29 In fact, harassment
and hostile workplace environment law can tread quite seriously on core political
and religious speech. 30
Some state laws provide that school districts must adopt policies that
address both bullying and cyberbullying. For example, Oregon law provides that
“Each school district shall adopt a policy prohibiting harassment, intimidation or
bullying and prohibiting cyberbullying.” 31 Other states have laws that provide
schools must address cyberbullying in their codes of conduct but do not define the

27. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., ANALYSIS OF STATE BULLYING LAWS AND POLICIES 47–48 (2011),
https://www2.ed.gov/rschstat/eval/bullying/state-bullying-laws/state-bullying-laws.pdf (noting that
twenty-seven states have included specific provisions in laws that direct public school districts to address
cyberbullying).
28. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-2-21(D) (repealed 2019).
29. Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Workplace Harassment, 39 UCLA L. Rev. 1791, 1800
(1992).
30. Id. at 1801–02.
31. OR. REV. STAT. § 339.356(1) (West, Westlaw though 2020 Reg. Sess.).
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term cyberbullying. 32 Still other states require that the department of education
maintain a list of resources for parents and school officials to deal with the
phenomenon. 33
Lidsky and Garcia explain that much cyberbullying legislation suffers from
a significant problem: “The critical constitutional flaw in much of the new criminal
legislation is that, in its attempt to ‘eliminate’ cyberbullying, it conflates the
definition of cyberbullying as a social problem with the legal definition of
cyberbullying as a crime, leading to laws that violate the First Amendment.” 34
II.

A.

COURT DECISIONS INVALIDATING CRIMINAL ANTICYBERBULLYING LAWS

Criminal Law Decisions

The push to combat cyberbullying comes with a laudable purpose—the
protection of minors. However, some of the laws do not comport with constitutional
standards. A classic example comes from a law passed by Albany County, New
York. The law defined cyberbullying as follows:
any act of communicating or causing a communication to be sent
by mechanical or electronic means, including posting statements
on the internet or through a computer or email network,
disseminating embarrassing or sexually explicit photographs;
disseminating private, personal, false or sexual information, or
sending hate mail, with no legitimate private, personal, or public
purpose, with the intent to harass, annoy, threaten, abuse, taunt,
intimidate, torment, humiliate, or otherwise inflict significant
emotional harm on another person. 35
Authorities charged high school student Marquan M. with violating the law after he
posted on Facebook sexually-charged comments on photos of several classmates.
New York’s highest court, in People v. Marquan M., determined that the law was
way too broad. 36 “The language of the local law embraces a wide array of
applications that prohibit types of protected speech far beyond the cyberbullying of
children,” the court wrote. 37 “On its face, the law covers communications aimed at
adults, and fictitious or corporate entities, even though the county legislature justified
passage of the provision based on the detrimental effects that cyberbullying has on
32. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-6-4002(d)(3) (West, Westlaw through 2020 First Reg. Sess. of
111th Gen. Assemb. (stating that a school’s code of conduct shall address “[f]ighting, threats, bullying,
cyberbullying, and hazing by students”).
33. See IND. CODE § 20-19-3-11.5 (West, Westlaw through 2020 Second Reg. Sess. of the 12st Gen.
Assemb.) (“The department shall maintain a link on the department’s Internet web site that provides
parents and school officials with resources or best practices regarding the prevention and reporting of
bullying and cyberbullying. The resources must include guidance on how to report to law enforcement
agencies instances of bullying and cyberbullying that occur off campus.”).
34. Lyrissa Lidsky & Andrea Pinzon Garcia, How Not to Criminalize Cyberbullying, 77 MO. L. REV.
693, 698 (2012).
35. People v. Marquan M., 19 N.E.3d 480, 484 (N.Y. 2014).
36. Id. at 488.
37. Id. at 486.
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school-aged children.” 38 The court also explained that the First Amendment protects
much annoying and embarrassing speech and such speech would be criminalized
under this Albany County law. 39
The North Carolina Supreme Court invalidated a similar law in State v.
Bishop, another case involving a high school student who posted sexually-themed
material and comments about a classmate. 40 Robert Bishop was charged and
convicted of violating North Carolina’s cyberbullying law, which provided: “it shall
be unlawful for any person to use a computer or computer network to . . . post or
encourage others to post on the Internet private, personal, or sexual information
pertaining to a minor.” 41
Bishop and Dillon Price were classmates at Southern Alamance High
School. Some of Price’s classmates, including Robert Bishop, began posting
negative information on Price’s Facebook page. Some of the comments were of a
sexual nature. Prosecutors charged Bishop with cyberbullying.
A jury convicted Bishop of one count of cyberbullying. 42 On appeal, Bishop
contended that the statute violated his First Amendment free-speech rights. However,
the North Carolina Court of Appeals determined that the statute regulated conduct,
not speech. 43 The appeals court explained: “The Cyber-bullying Statute is not
directed at prohibiting the communication of thoughts or ideas via the Internet. It
prohibits the intentional and specific conduct of intimidating or tormenting a
minor. This conduct falls outside the purview of the First Amendment.” 44
Furthermore, the intermediate appellate court determined that any impact on speech
was incidental rather than direct. 45
Bishop appealed to the North Carolina Supreme Court. The state high court
first rejected the idea that the cyberbullying statute regulated conduct instead of
speech. The high court explained that the statute clearly prohibited online posting of
particular subject matter and, as such, regulated speech. 46 “Posting information on
the Internet—whatever the subject matter—can constitute speech as surely as
stapling flyers to bulletin boards or distributing pamphlets to passersby—activities
long protected by the First Amendment,” the court explained. 47
Next, the state high court applied the content discrimination principle—
perhaps the leading doctrinal principle in First Amendment law. 48 Under this
38. Id. at 486.
39. Id. at 487.
40. 787 S.E.2d 814 (N.C. 2016).
41. Id. at 815 (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-458.1(a)(1)(d) (West, Westlaw though 2019 Reg. Sess.).
42. Id. at 816.
43. State v. Bishop, 774 S.E.2d 337, 343 (N.C. Ct. App. 2015).
44. Id.
45. Id. at 344.
46. Bishop, 787 S.E.2d at 819.
47. Id. at 817.
48. See, e.g., Ashutosh Bhagwat, In Defense of Content Regulation, 102 IOWA L. REV. 1427, 1428
(2017) (describing the content discrimination principle as the “central tenet” of First Amendment freespeech jurisprudence); Erwin Chemerinsky, Content Neutrality as a Central Problem of Freedom of
Speech: Problems in the Supreme Court’s Application, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 49, 49 (2000) (describing the
content discrimination principle as “the central inquiry” in First Amendment law); Genevieve Lakier,
Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Arizona and the Rise of the Rise of the Anticlassificatory First Amendment, 2016
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principle, content-based laws—or laws which regulate speech based on their subject
matter or content—are subject to strict scrutiny, while content-neutral laws are
subject to only intermediate scrutiny. 49 Content-based laws are presumptively
unconstitutional. 50
The North Carolina high court determined that the law was clearly content
based because it defined and criminalized speech based on its subject matter. 51 The
court wrote: “The statute criminalizes some messages but not others, and makes it
impossible to determine whether the accused has committed a crime without
examining the content of his communication.” 52 Because the law was content-based,
the court applied strict scrutiny. While the state had a compelling government interest
in protecting minors, the state high court determined that the law was not narrowly
tailored. The court was troubled by the fact that “the statute contains no requirement
that the subject of an online posting suffer injury as a result, or even that he or she
become aware of such a posting.” 53 The court concluded that while the state had a
laudable purpose “North Carolina’s cyberbullying statute ‘create[s] a criminal
prohibition of alarming breadth.’” 54
North Carolina’s high court noted that the law “contains no requirement
that the subject of an online posting suffer injury as a result, or even that he or she
become aware of such a posting.” 55 The court also explained that the breadth of the
law meant that it could cover the “posting [of] any information about any specific
minor.” 56
These decisions show that cyberbullying laws can violate core First
Amendment principles. Sometimes the laws are simply too broad or too vague, either
sweeping within their ambit of protected speech or leaving would-be speakers at a
loss for when their speech might cross the line from protected expression to
unprotected cyberbullying. Other statutes use terms that are equally troubling such
as “hostile” or “annoying.” Many of the cyberbullying laws are not geared toward
prohibiting only those types of speech that fall within certain unprotected categories
of expression, such as true threats.
B.

School Decisions

The issue of cyberbullying often arises in public schools. As mentioned
earlier, many states have laws that require public school districts to address

SUP. CT. REV. 233, 233 (2016) (“The distinction between content-based and content-neutral regulations
of speech is one of the most important in First Amendment law.”); Susan H. Williams, Content
Discrimination and the First Amendment, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 615, 616 (1991) (calling the content
discrimination “[o]ne of the most important” in First Amendment law and a principle of “growing
prominence”).
49. See Barry P. McDonald, Speech and Distrust: Rethinking the Content Approach to Protecting the
Freedom of Expression, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1347, 1351– 52 (2006).
50. See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2226 (2015).
51. See Bishop, 787 S.E.2d at 819.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 820.
54. Id. at 821 (quoting United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 474 (2010)).
55. Id. at 820.
56. Id. at 821.
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cyberbullying. Public school districts may find that a student has engaged in
cyberbullying that violates the school’s code of conduct. Such action by a student
may not rise to the level of a criminal act but it can still violate school rules and lead
to suspensions or even expulsions.
The key question is what authority public school officials have to punish
students for off-campus, online speech. The U.S. Supreme Court has not answered
the question, leaving school officials in an area of significant uncertainty. 57 The
leading student-speech case remains Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community
School District, a 1969 decision in which the Supreme Court ruled that public school
officials violated the free-speech rights of several students by suspending them for
wearing black peace armbands. 58 In Tinker, the Court reasoned that public school
officials cannot punish students for their expression unless they can reasonably
forecast that the student speech will cause a substantial disruption of school activities
or invade the rights of others. 59
The dominant test from Tinker is the so-called substantial disruption
standard. 60 Thus, school officials generally would have to point to something that
occurs on school grounds that results from a student’s cyberbullying. In other words,
there must be a nexus, or connection, between the off-campus online speech and
what occurs on campus. James C. Hanks, author of School Bullying: How Long Is
the Arm of the Law?, writes that “courts thus far are saying ‘Show me the nexus.’” 61
The federal circuit courts of appeals appear divided on the question. Many
circuits will apply the Tinker “reasonable forecast of substantial disruption” test if
they determine that there is a close enough connection between the online bullying
and ramifications at school. For example, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled
in Kowalski v. Berkeley County Schools that public school officials in West Virginia
could punish a student for violating the school’s policy against “harassment,
bullying, and intimidation” for creating a web page devoted to mocking another
student. 62 The appeals court reasoned that there was a “sufficient strongly” nexus or
connection between the student’s web posts and bullying that occurred on school
grounds. 63
Similarly, the Second U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in Doninger v.
Niehoff that public school officials in Connecticut were entitled to qualified
immunity even though they punished a student for blogging on her own computer
off school grounds that “jamfest [had] been cancelled due to the douchebags in

57. See David L. Hudson Jr., Time for the Supreme Court to Address Off-Campus, Online Student
Speech, 91 OR. L. REV. 621, 622 (2012).
58. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
59. Id. at 513.
60. See David L. Hudson Jr., Substantial Disruption Test, FIRST AMEND. ENCYCLOPEDIA,
https://www.mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/1584/substantial-disruption-test [https://perma.cc/FBW9497E]; see also David L. Hudson Jr., The Leading Student-Speech Standard: Reasonable Forecast of
Substantial Disruption, NAT’L ASS’N OF SCH. RESOURCE OFFICERS, Fall 2014,
https://www.nasro.org/clientuploads/legal%20articles/The-Leading-Student-Speech-Standard-by-DavidHudson-Jr-JOSS-Fall-2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/6DYQ-72H4].
61. JAMES C. HANKS, SCHOOL BULLYING: HOW LONG IS THE ARM OF THE LAW 100 (2d ed. 2016).
62. 652 F.3d 565, 569 (4th Cir. 2011).
63. Id. at 573.
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central office.” 64 Instead, the appeals court reasoned that it was “reasonably
foreseeable that [the student’s] post would reach school property and have disruptive
consequences there.” 65
However, the Third U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in Layshock v.
Hermitage School District that public school officials in Pennsylvania violated the
First Amendment when they punished a high school student for creating a fake
MySpace profile of his principal and mocking him. 66 “It would be an unseemly and
dangerous precedent to allow the state, in the guise of school authorities, to reach
into a child’s home and control his/her actions there to the same extent that it can
control that child when he/she participates in school sponsored activities,” the court
wrote. 67
The lack of uniformity in these cases is noticeable and a real problem for
students, parents, teachers, and school officials. One legal scholar has identified at
least five different approaches to the problem of determining what authority a public
school has to regulate off-campus speech:
(1) no authority to regulate off-campus speech; (2) little to no
distinction between off-campus and on-campus expression; (3)
requiring a sufficient nexus between the off-campus expression
and the school environment; (4) requiring that the online speech
creator reasonably forecast that the student speech reach the school
environment; and (5) limiting school officials’ authority to act
when there is a clear and identifiable threat. 68
Most courts require some sort of nexus or connection between the student’s
off-campus, online speech and events that occur at school. The Ninth U.S. Circuit
Court of Appeals recently explained the three relevant factors that it considers in
determining when school officials can punish or regulate student off-campus
expression: “(1) the degree and likelihood of harm to the school caused or augured
by the speech; (2) whether it was reasonably foreseeable that the speech would reach
and impact the school; and (3) the relation between the content and context of the
speech and the school.” 69
While it appears clear that courts will continue to use the Tinker case as the
lodestar case, what is less clear is which part of Tinker courts will rely upon to justify
restrictions of student’s harmful expression. While most courts still use the
substantial disruption test, in the era of cyberbullying, more courts will return to
Tinker’s second prong—the invasion of the rights of others. 70
The unsettled nature over the reach of school official’s authority to regulate
students’ off-campus, online expression remains a pressing issue in First

64. 642 F.3d 334, 340 (2d. Cir. 2011).
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Cyberbullying, 2016 UTAH L. REV. 831, 848.
69. McNeil v. Sherwood Sch. Dist., 918 F.3d 700, 707 (9th Cir. 2019) (citations omitted).
70. See David L. Hudson Jr., How Free is Student Speech?, FREEDOM F. INST. (May 7, 2009),
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Amendment law. But, there is another unanswered question in student speech
jurisprudence that could prove just as important to cyberbullying and free speech.
This question concerns the reach of Tinker’s forgotten test—the invasion of the
rights of others. 71
Recall that in Tinker the Supreme Court not only ruled that school officials
could prohibit student speech when it posed a substantial disruption of school
activities, but also when it impinges on the rights of other students. 72 However, the
Supreme Court has never explained when student speech impinges or invades the
rights of other students.
Some lower courts have examined this prong of Tinker and a few have even
used the standard to justify the restriction of student speech. A prime example is the
Ninth Circuit’s decision in Harper v. Poway Unified School District. 73 High school
Tyler Harper wore t-shirts to his public school in response to his school sanctioning
a “Day of Silence” by the school’s Gay-Straight Alliance. Harper wore a t-shirt with
the message “I WILL NOT ACCEPT WHAT GOD HAS CONDEMNED” on the
front and “HOMOSEXUALITY IS SHAMEFUL ‘Romans 1:27’” on the back. 74 The
next day he wore a t-shirt with the message “BE ASHAMED, OUR SCHOOL
EMBRACED WHAT GOD HAS CONDEMNED.” 75
School officials told him the t-shirts were “inflammatory” and created a
“negative and hostile environment” for others. 76 While he was not suspended, Harper
had to remain in the principal’s office for the day and could not wear the t-shirts to
school anymore. 77 He filed a federal lawsuit, alleging a violation of his First
Amendment and other rights. 78 A federal district court dismissed some of his claims
but not his First Amendment claims. 79 On appeal, a three-judge panel of the Ninth
U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and ruled in favor of the school officials. 80
The Ninth Circuit determined that Harper’s t-shirts invaded the rights of
others students “in the most fundamental way.” 81 “Being secure involves not only
freedom from physical assaults but from psychological attacks that cause young
people to question their self-worth and their rightful place in society,” the panel
wrote. 82
The appeals court emphasized that gay and lesbian students were vulnerable
to abuse from other students and Harper’s t-shirts created a hostile environment for
gay and lesbian students. 83 The panel wrote that “the School had a valid and lawful
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basis for restricting Harper’s wearing of his T-shirt on the ground that his conduct
was injurious to gay and lesbian students and interfered with their right to learn.” 84
The Eleventh U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals utilized Tinker’s invasion of
the rights of others to uphold the expulsion of a college student who sent sexually
harassing text messages to a female classmate. 85 He sent her a variety of vulgar texts
and also pictures when she declined his advances to date. 86 The Eleventh Circuit
explained that the student’s unwanted texts and “persistent harassment” of a female
classmate invaded “her rights ‘to be secure and let alone.’” 87
The student argued that the college had no authority to discipline him for
his text messages because he sent them all while he was off-campus. 88 The appeals
court explained: “But Tinker teaches that ‘conduct by the student, in class or out of
it’ that results in the ‘invasion of the rights of others is, of course, not immunized by
the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech.” 89
The decision is significant for several reasons, including: (1) the Eleventh
Circuit applied the K-12 precedent of Tinker and applied it on the college level; (2)
the appeals court emphasized and revitalized the forgotten prong of Tinker that is
focused on the invasion of the rights of others; and (3) that college officials can
punish students for off-campus behavior. 90
Author James C. Hanks asks the question in a similar fashion: “Will the
courts adopt a broader standard for regulation of student conduct based on the
‘invasion of the rights of others’ principle enunciated in Tinker?” 91 He points out
that widespread use of the “invasion of the rights of others” standard “would
dramatically change the judicial discourse concerning bullying that is based on
speech.” 92
CONCLUSION
It seems likely that the push to combat bullying and cyber-bullying will
continue, particularly if more tragic suicides of young persons occur at least in part
from harassment by others. This likely means that there will be cases involving
cyberbullying—both criminal and school-code-of-conduct cases. While some of the
early statutes appear to have been written too broadly and without sufficient clarity,
some of the newer statutes now appear to comport with at least more constitutional
standards. However, there is still an alarming degree of uncertainty as to the
application of some of these cyberbullying statutes.
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The problem becomes more exacerbated at the public school level when
school administrators attempt to punish students for their off-campus, online
expression. First, it is questionable exactly how far the arm of school authority
extends to off-campus social media expression. Second, it often is difficult for school
administrators to show a clear nexus or connection between the off-campus student
expression and something that happens on school grounds. Third, there is a
significant amount of uncertainty as to when exactly some student speech “invades”
or “infringes” the rights of other students.

